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I have been asked repeatedly if the Arab Gulf States (AGS) are “members” of the Global
South – as if it was a club whose membership was dependent upon some particular traits
or distinguished behaviour. The fact is that in the burgeoning literature on the Global
South, the AGS (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates) are marginalized and this has consequences to our understanding of the
conceptual meaning and political significance of the South.
It is not news that the scholarship on the Global South and South-South relations is
BRICScentric and that when Arab states and peoples appear in this emerging body of
knowledge they are irrelevant, on the sidelines, an afterthought even. Locating them in
the Global South is therefore controversial, especially if we are talking about the Arab
Gulf States. It is as if they did not fit into the proposed narrative – as if they did not have
the right credentials to get in.
However, word-playing with Waltz’s famous statement that “it would be ridiculous to
construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica,” I would
suggest that it is just as absurd to construct a theory of the Global South based on the
BRICS. The distortions generated by Waltz’s focus on great powers and his contempt for
Costa Rica are reproduced within Global South studies with an excessive focus on the
BRICS at the expense of other countries, regions, institutions, movements and
individuals, especially those who do not fit into the emerging narrative of the Global
South. The BRICS as a group and its member states separately match too perfectly the
narrative of the Global South as an entity led by “rising powers” or “Southern giants” or
even “emerging middle powers” that are becoming powerful enough to change the rules
of the international system, dictated by the North. However, it could be argued that what
is rising or emerging is not the South, but a narrative about the South which constitutes
some states as Southern states and some dynamics as South-South dynamics.
1/4
But what about those states which are not easily encompassed by this narrative not
because they are powerless, in the sense of not possessing enough material or ideational
“capabilities” to join the club of those who challenge the system; but rather precisely
because possessing the material capabilities to challenge the system they choose not to
do so? If Namibia is forgiven for its powerlessness will Saudi Arabia be forgiven for its
unwillingness?
When Terterov, Vallet and Nocente (2013) say that Saudi Arabia does not belong to the
South “given the development levels that the Kingdom has been able to reach with the
help of oil incomes” and make it the “the North” of what they call “the Muslim South” they
are reproducing the North-South binary to discuss dynamics that are much better
explained in terms of South-South power relations. Actually, how can someone question
Saudi Arabia’s “location” in the Global South in terms of its economic development? Then
what about China? If Saudi Arabia is the Muslim North then China is what – the North of
the East? What I am getting at here is that there is no North in the South – because the
South is not a place, it is not a thing. If we move past our passion for binaries we can
realize that what we are actually dealing with when we speak about the reproduction of
North-South relations in the Global South are power relations involved in the
constitution of the South.
In this sense, the fact that the khaleeji capital (capital from the Gulf) is profit-seeking and
that its investments in the Middle East and other Muslim countries come with a whole
set of political conditionalities should not obliterate the importance of the established
record of South-South cooperation driven by the AGS, especially as far as the role that
Arab and Islamic institutions play in promoting development in Africa, Asia and the
Middle East. Arab official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct investment (FDI),
development banks and migration flows belong to the realm of South-South cooperation
in the same way that they belong to the realm of South-South power relations. In this
context, the relations that have historically been forged on the grounds of Arab or
Muslim solidarity can legitimately be framed as South-South cooperation.
If AGS’ foreign policy makers intend to strengthen the role of the South in the
international system or if they want to change the rules of the international game is not
actually relevant for them to play this role. Intentionality is not a condition for action. The
fact is that AGS’s ODA, FDI and remittances from migrant workers strengthen the idea
that there are political and economic dynamics that belong to the realm of the South
where the North is not part of the equation. Obviously this does not prevent us from
understanding that all human behaviour is still structured around the needs of the
global capitalism led by the North/West. Well, the South is a discourse that emerged
from the waters of capitalism – see how it is framed in terms of investments, capital
flows, development banks, transnational infrastructure projects, etc. And when we talk
about it, the role played by the AGS can’t be downplayed.
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Does the assistance provided for developing countries by Saudi Arabia or the UAE come
with contentious and cumbersome political conditionalities? Of course they do and I
mostly side with Adam Hanieh (2011) when he says that these conditionalities can be so
deleterious that it might be better for Arab countries to get this money elsewhere. Where
would this be? In global financial institutions controlled by European and North
American capital? It seems that the North is always on call, waiting to step in when things
go wrong in the South.
The consolidation of the narrative on the Global South as a political space comprised of
rising or emerging (state) powers who challenge the North will relegate to an inferior
category within the South those who do not openly question or oppose the North. If left
unchallenged, this foundational myth of the South will end up reproducing the forms of
exclusion that Arab states and peoples are submitted to within the various realms of IR
scholarship. This is, indeed, the greatest theoretical and political challenge of locating the
AGS in the South: that the Arab Gulf states do not appear in the emerging Global South
narrative only as an example of what is not expected from the South; or only as an
example of what the South should not be. Something as a blemish in the otherwise
supposed immaculate behaviour of those like China and Russia towards their Southern
fellows. We have also to be careful not to reproduce an Orientalist narrative that takes
the Saudis for Mohammed bin Salman and the Emiratis for Mohammed bin Zayed. In
this regard, Kuwaiti critical voices and Qatari political activists can’t be excluded from the
narrative of the Global South because the behaviour of their political and economic
elites does not always match our expectations of South-South relations as an alternative
to North-South relations.
I conclude arguing that we have to find better ways to accommodate Arab Gulf States
and peoples in the Global South narrative because if we conceptualize them as driving
forces of the South we can frame their ODA, FDI, development banks, labour markets,
social movements and political activism as prevailing signifying practices that could make
the signifier “South” even more meaningful. This is a complicated – yet necessary –
political and intellectual manoeuvre.
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